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Fraud is occurring on a global scale. With the ease of money movement and
the protection of bank secrecy laws, international fraud is difficult to detect.
Recovery of stolen and illegally acquired funds is even more difficult. As one
example, take the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) case.
When the Bank of England shut down BCCI on July 5, 1991, thousands of
depositors lost their life savings. In July of 1995, five years later, the depositors
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were still waiting for their money and stood to recover, at best, 30-40 percent
of their funds. The initial estimate had been less than 10 percent. Meanwhile a
former BCCI officer, S.Z.A. Akbar, who was responsible for an estimated $500
million in commodities trading losses, was convicted of false accounting, and
served twenty-four months in prison, is charged in New York with extortion of
at least $15 million from BCCI. These funds have never been recovered.
The Salvation Army was defrauded out of $8.8 million through a fraudulent
investment scheme, and the money was recovered more than three years later
only after tracing the assets through thirteen countries and bringing civil actions
in several jurisdictions. In the Maxwell fraud case in the United Kingdom, a
pension fund had been improperly pledged as collateral, resulting in losses of
approximately $270 million. After four years of litigation, trustees for the pension
fund were able to recover most of the funds through settlement of civil claims.
Losses from the collapse of Barings Bank, another massive bank failure in the
United Kingdom, are estimated at £860 million.
In the United States, huge losses occurred when hundreds of savings and loan
institutions failed in the 1980s. Charles Keating was convicted of fraud and
responsible for multi-million dollar losses when Lincoln Savings and Loan col-
lapsed. Thomas Billman caused the collapse of Community Savings and Loan
Association in Maryland and transferred $22 million to personal Swiss bank
accounts. Orange County, California, lost $1.7 billion due to fraud and went
bankrupt as a result. Former County Treasurer Robert L. Citron pleaded guilty
to fraud, and two other former county officials were indicted.
In all of these cases, tracing the assets and recovering the proceeds of the
fraud have proved to be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. And even if
the defendant is caught and convicted, victims of fraud are often required to
bring civil actions to recover their money. One reason for this requirement is
that the aim of a criminal prosecution is conviction of the defendant, not recovery
of funds. In addition, tracing the assets through a number of offshore jurisdictions
may be too time-consuming, particularly where the investigation is hampered
by secrecy and confidentiality laws restricting the disclosure of bank and business
records. Procedures are available for seeking such evidence, such as mutual legal
assistance treaties, but these require formal requests and court orders, which
take time to execute.
Limitations on sharing information also hamper investigations. Civil investiga-
tors may be unwilling to share information with prosecutors, and similarly, prose-
cutors may be precluded from sharing information with victims or persons acting
on their behalf due to restrictions on use of information provided under mutual
legal assistance treaties or other international evidence-sharing arrangements. In
addition, the police may not have the resources to devote to tracing and locating
stolen funds. In recent years, the international law enforcement community has
made a concerted effort to combat drug trafficking by seizing and confiscating
drug proceeds. This effort is exemplified by the signing of the Vienna Drug
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Convention in 1988,' which more than 115 countries have ratified. In fraud cases,
however, procedures for tracing and recovering the proceeds of crime are not
as uniform. The end result is that the defendant is often able to hide and retain
stolen funds.
Recent legislation in the United Kingdom, the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995,
addresses this problem. This article compares the laws of the United Kingdom
and the United States on asset seizure and confiscation; reviews procedures avail-
able to investigate international fraud and compensate victims; and discusses
whether closer cooperation is needed to ensure that fraudulently obtained funds
are seized and returned to the victims.
I. Overview
The United States and the United Kingdom take an entirely different approach
in forfeiture cases. In the United States, a criminal conviction is not required.
Civil forfeiture actions may be filed directly against property involved in an
offense, and they are widely used. Civil forfeiture proceedings can be brought
in addition to criminal proceedings, and the value of the seized property may be
unrelated to the proceeds derived from the offense, which has led to constitutional
challenges based on the Excessive Fines Clause and the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In the United Kingdom, confiscation of property is based on the theory that a
defendant should not be permitted to profit from crime. The U.K. confiscation
order is based on a post-trial assessment by the court of the amount of benefit
derived from the criminal activity. A conviction is required.
In the United States, a forfeiture order is considered part of a criminal sentence,
whereas in the United Kingdom it is not. Also, the U. S. government must connect
the property to the crime or show the original proceeds to have been dissipated.
In the United Kingdom, the confiscation order is a money judgment against the
defendant based on the court's determination of the amount of benefit and the
property available to satisfy the order. It does not matter if the criminal proceeds
have been dissipated, comingled, or reinvested; any available asset, whether or
not derived from the criminal activity, can be used to satisfy the order.
Another difference is that U.K. law now permits confiscation of the proceeds
of all crimes. In the United States, numerous laws provide for forfeiture of
specified criminal activity, but fraud proceeds are not always subject to forfei-
ture-some sort of nexus is required, e.g., a federally insured bank.
The ability to return seized funds to the victims is quite different. If a confisca-
tion order is entered, the U.K. court has the power to enforce a compensation
order to reimburse the victims first. In the United States, title vests with the
government at the time the offense is committed and the funds are transferred
1. U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.82/15 (1990).
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to the asset forfeiture fund upon entry of the final order. At that time, the attorney
general or secretary of treasury may, but is not required to, pay restitution out
of forfeited funds. Procedures for investigating and tracing criminal proceeds
also differ dramatically. The U.K. authorities have broader powers to compel
testimony and production of evidence, but they have no grand jury. In addition,
in both countries the ability of civil and criminal investigators to share information
is limited.
II. U.S. Forfeiture Laws
In the United States, forfeiture is based on the theory that the property itself
is tainted, whereas in the United Kingdom, confiscation is directed at the proceeds
of crime-that is, the amount by which the defendant benefited from the criminal
conduct. The U.S. forfeiture order is entered against the property, not against
the defendant. The property is transferred to the government as soon as the
forfeiture order is final. In the United States, the government may file a civil in
rem forfeiture action directly against the property or bring a criminal forfeiture
charge against the defendant as part of a criminal prosecution. In a civil forfeiture
proceeding, the identity of the wrongdoer is irrelevant. Civil forfeiture merely
requires proof that the property itself was the proceeds of a crime or was involved
in a crime. The doctrine that the property itself is considered the offender in a
civil forfeiture action "has a venerable history in our case law.' 2 Civil forfeiture
may be imposed even where the owner of the property is not legally guilty of the
criminal offense or "where the innocence of the owner was 'fully established.' "3
Criminal forfeiture actions are charged in the indictment, and if the defendant
is convicted, the jury is then required to render a special verdict concerning the
property subject to forfeiture. The standard of proof for criminal forfeiture is
beyond a reasonable doubt, as in all criminal convictions. In civil forfeiture
actions, the standard of proof is probable cause to initiate the action or seize
property.4 Once probable cause is shown, the burden shifts to the owner to
demonstrate that the property is not forfeitable. 5
In criminal forfeiture actions, the government must either prove that the prop-
erty was the proceeds of the offense, used to facilitate the offense, traceable to
such property, or substitute assets if the original assets have been dissipated.6
2. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615 (1993).
3. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684, reh 'g denied, 417 U.S.
977 (1974).
4. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615 (1989) (the government may "seize property
based on a finding of probable cause to believe that the property will ultimately be proved forfeitable");
see also United States v. One Twin Engine Beech Airplane, 533 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. 1982 Yukon Delta Houseboat, 774 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1985).
5. United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529 F.2d 65, 66 (9th Cir. 1976).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (1994) (the court shall order that any person convicted of specified
money laundering offenses forfeit to the United States "any property, real or personal, involved in
such offense, or any property traceable to such property"). For fraud affecting U.S. financial institu-
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Substitute assets can be forfeited if any of the property subject to forfeiture, as
a result of any act or omission of the defendant-"(1) cannot be located upon
the exercise of due diligence; (2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited
with, a third party; (3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or (5) has been commingled with
other property which cannot be divided without difficulty.. . ."7 These forfeiture
rules are vastly different from the U.K. system, where any asset belonging to
the defendant (or gifts made by the defendant within the relevant time period)
may be used to satisfy a confiscation order. In addition, U.S. courts are divided
over whether the government can restrain substitute assets pretrial in fraud and
racketeering cases.
Unlike the U.K. confiscation laws, forfeiture orders are not available for all
crimes. The U.S. government can bring criminal forfeiture actions in narcotics
cases, racketeering (RICO) cases, and money laundering cases, for specified
unlawful activities, including fraud. 8 No general forfeiture provision is available
for fraud; forfeiture is only possible if the proceeds of the fraud have been
laundered or a federally insured bank or financial institution was defrauded. 9
This limitation in the U.S. system is a key difference between the United States
and the United Kingdom. The Department of Justice has proposed amendments
to the forfeiture statutes to make the proceeds of all federal financial crimes in
title 18 of the United States Code subject to forfeiture, so that forfeiture would be
available as a sanction in white-collar crimes such as fraud and public corruption .'o
Because forfeiture is not possible in all fraud cases, restitution to the victims is
much more difficult, as powers of restraint are not available, and the government's
powers to obtain restitution orders are limited, as will be discussed below.
In addition to not covering all crimes, the fact that the forfeiture is not based
on the amount of benefit, as in the United Kingdom, but rather on the "taint"
or "criminality" of the property itself, has resulted in disproportionate forfeitures
in the United States, as well as recent decisions curtailing the government's ability
to bring both civil and criminal forfeiture actions.
In Austin v. United States" the Court held that civil forfeiture constituted
punishment and was subject to the Eighth Amendment prohibition against exces-
tions, § 982(a)(2) provides that the court shall order forfeiture of "any property constituting, or
derived from, proceeds the person obtained directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation."
The substitute assets provision of 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1994) is applicable to fraud and money
laundering offenses listed in § 982 pursuant to § 982(b)(1).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 85 3 (p) (1994).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (for money laundering violations); see also 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313(a),
5316, or 5324; or 18 U.S.C §§ 1956, 1957, or 1960; 21 U.S.C. § 853 (for narcotics offenses); 18
U.S.C. § 1963 (for racketeering offenses).
9. Id.
10. Forfeiture Act 1995, Title III.
11. 509 U.S. 602, 612 (1993).
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sive fines.12 Austin pleaded guilty to one count of possession of cocaine and was
sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. The government subsequently filed a
civil forfeiture action seeking forfeiture of Austin's mobile home and auto body
shop. The evidence showed that Austin sold two grams of cocaine at the body
shop, which he retrieved from his mobile home. In addition, small amounts of
marijuana and cocaine and $4,700 in cash were also discovered at the body shop
and mobile home. The court of appeals reluctantly affirmed the district court's
order of forfeiture, holding that in civil forfeiture actions where the government
is proceeding against property in rem, the guilt or innocence of the property's
owner" 'is constitutionally irrelevant.' 9m3 Thus, " '[i]f the constitution allows
in rem forfeiture to be visited upon innocent owners ... the constitution hardly
requires proportionality review of forfeitures .... , -14
The Supreme Court reviewed the history of the Eighth Amendment and
concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause was not limited to criminal cases.
The Court determined, after an extensive review of civil and criminal forfeiture
proceedings, that forfeiture, whether civil or criminal, operates as punish-
ment 15 and that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment was
applicable because "[t]he purpose of the Eighth Amendment . . .was to limit
the government's power to punish. . . .The Excessive Fines Clause limits
the Government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, 'as
punishment for some offense.' ,16
The Court also relied on United States v. Halper, 7 another case that limited
the government's ability to proceed both civilly and criminally. In Halper, the
government, following a criminal conviction, brought a civil RICO action and
sought treble damages. The Supreme Court ruled that "the Government may
not criminally prosecute a defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon him, and
then bring a separate civil action based on the same conduct and receive a judgment
12. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
13. Austin, 509 U.S. at 606 (quoting United States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d 814,
817 (8th Cir. 1992)).
14. United States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom.
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (quoting United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d
232, 234 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989)).
15. The Court (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)) noted
that three kinds of forfeiture were established in England at the time the Eighth Amendment was
ratified: deodand, which involved forfeiture of an inanimate object directly or indirectly causing the
accidental death of a King's subject; forfeiture upon conviction for a felony or treason, which was
based on conviction and required forfeiture of property, real and personal, to the Crown in cases
of treason and forfeiture of chattels to the Crown and land escheating to his lord for convicted felons;
and statutory forfeiture, for seizure of offending objects used in violation of the customs and revenue
laws.
16. Austin, 509 U.S. at 609, 610 (citing Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)).
17. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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that is not rationally related to the goal of making the Government whole." 18
As a result, a civil case resulting in civil sanctions that are punitive as well as
remedial is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, and a criminal case brought
after a civil case would also be barred where the sanctions "cannot fairly be
said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also
serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, [and are therefore] punishment,
as we have come to understand the term." 19
Applying the rationale of Austin and Halper, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held in United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency" that a civil
forfeiture proceeding that followed a criminal conviction was barred by the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause. The court stated that "[in light of the decision in Austin,
and applying the Halper test here, we find the conclusion inescapable that civil
forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) constitutes
'punishment' which triggers the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause." 2'
Accordingly, the court ordered that the forfeited funds be returned to the defen-
dants. The court rejected the government's argument that the forfeiture action
was simply an attempt to forfeit the illegal proceeds, noting that the narcotic
forfeiture statute is broader and covers any money " 'used or intended to be
used' " to facilitate a narcotics transaction. 22 Following $405,089.23 U.S. Cur-
rency, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Ursery on double jeopardy grounds
overturned a criminal conviction that followed a civil forfeiture action.23
The Supreme Court overturned these decisions in United States v. Ursery,24
and concluded that for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, civil forfeitures
do not constitute punishment. The Court noted that under common law, the right
of forfeiture did not attach until conviction, and a holding that a civil forfeiture
would be prohibited by the prior criminal proceeding "would have been directly
contrary to the common-law rule, and would have called into question the constitu-
tionality of forfeiture statutes thought constitutional for over a century. 25 Citing
previous decisions in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,26 and
Various Items of Personal Property v. United States,27 the Court held that "in
rem civil forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction, distinct from potentially punitive
in personam civil penalties such as fines, and does not constitute a punishment
for double jeopardy purposes.' 28
18. Id. at 451.
19. Id. at 448.
20. 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), amended and reh 'g denied, 56 F.3d 41 (1995), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 762 (No. 95-346), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
21. 33 F.3d at 1219 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 1221.
23. 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
24. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
25. Id. at 2141.
26. 455 U.S. 354 (1984).
27. 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
28. Id. at 2137.
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The Court distinguished Halper as it involved an excessive civil penalty
'so extreme and so divorced from the Government's damages and expenses
as to constitute punishment.' ,29 The Court held that "[f]orfeitures ...are
designed primarily to confiscate property used in violation of the law, and to
require disgorgement of the fruits of illegal conduct. . . . [I]t is virtually impossi-
ble to quantify, even approximately, the nonpunitive purposes served by a particu-
lar civil forfeiture." 30 Thus, "the case-by-case balancing test set forth in Halper,
in which a court must compare the harm suffered by the Government against
the size of the penalty imposed, is inapplicable to civil forfeiture." 31 The Court
also distinguished its holding in Austin that civil forfeiture constituted punishment
under the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause, stating that while" [f]orfei-
tures effected under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are subject to review for
excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment after Austin; this does not mean
... that those forfeitures are so punitive as to constitute punishment for the
purposes of double jeopardy." 32
In reaching this decision, the Ursery Court made three findings: (1) Congress
intended forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. § 881 and 18 U.S.C. § 981 to be civil
proceedings; (2) there is little evidence that forfeiture under these statutes
"are so punitive . . . as to render them criminal despite Congress' intent to
the contrary;" ' 33 and (3) the statutes serve important nonpunitive goals of
preventing further illegal use of such property and "ensuring that persons do
not profit from their illegal acts."
3 4
As these cases illustrate, the fact that forfeiture is not based on the amount
by which the defendant benefited, but instead on the illegal use of the property,
has led to confusion and constitutional challenges. Under the Excessive Fines
Clause, forfeiture is considered punishment. Under the Double Jeopardy Clause,
it is not. In another recent case, the Supreme Court held that forfeiture is consid-
ered an element of the sentence imposed following a conviction or a guilty plea
and, as such, is not covered by the constitutional right to a jury trial. 35 The
defendant had argued that despite his plea agreement he was still entitled to a
jury trial on the criminal forfeiture count. The Court held that the judge need
not determine whether the assets to be forfeited pursuant to a plea agreement
are tied to the defendant's criminal activity. Justice Stevens, in a dissenting
opinion, cautioned that this decision could allow "a wealthy defendant [to] bargain
for a light sentence by voluntarily 'forfeiting' property to which the government
had no statutory entitlement. ,
36
29. Id. (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 442).
30. Id. at 2145.
31. Id. at 2145-46.
32. Id. at 2147.
33. Id. at 2138.
34. Id. at 2149.
35. Libretti v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 356 (1995).
36. Id. at 370.
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A. PRETRIAL RESTRAINT
The RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1963, provides for pretrial restraint of assets.
The statute provides that: "(d)(1) Upon application of the United States, the
court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a
satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the availability
of property . . . [subject to] forfeiture under this section. .. ."
This action is a criminal in personam action against the defendant, and the
restraining order may be sought upon the filing of an indictment or information.
The purpose of this provision is to preserve pending trial assets that may be
subject to forfeiture upon conviction. 37 For criminal forfeiture actions brought
under the general criminal forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 982, pretrial restraint
is governed by the narcotics pretrial restraint provisions.
The courts are divided on whether substitute assets may be restrained pretrial
in fraud cases. In In re Billman3" the government proved that Billman and other
conspirators transferred $22 million in misappropriated funds to Swiss bank ac-
counts. The government sought a pretrial restraining order for a wire transfer
of $499,935 that Billman, who had fled the country, had ordered transferred to
a codefendant in Maryland from a bank account in London. The government
could not prove that the funds in the London bank account had been transferred
from the Swiss accounts. The court of appeals held that even if the wire transfer
could not be traced to the proceeds deposited in Swiss bank accounts, the court
would be authorized by statute to order forfeiture of substitute assets postconvic-
tion. The court concluded that the RICO statute should be construed to authorize
pretrial restraint of substitute assets to avoid permitting a defendant "to thwart
the operation of forfeiture laws by absconding with RICO proceeds and then
transferring his substitute assets to a third person who does not qualify as a bona
fide purchaser for value." 39
The opposite conclusion was reached in United States v. Field, 40 where the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order vacating
a pretrial restraining order on the grounds that it did not have the power to restrain
assets before trial that were not fruits or instrumentalities of the crime. In Field,
the government sought a restraining order preventing the defendant in a fraud
case from dissipating assets allegedly obtained by fraud or other property up to
the value of the money obtained by fraud. In this case, forfeiture was alleged
under 18 U.S.C. § 982. The defendant argued this statute did not permit pretrial
restraint of substitute assets. The court agreed, holding that the statute only
37. United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1988).
38. 915 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 952 (1991).
39. 915 F.2d at 921.
40. 62 F.3d 246 (8th Cir. 1995).
SPRING 1997
12 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
authorizes postconviction seizure of substitute property if forfeitable property is
no longer available. 4'
These cases illustrate the split among the circuits on whether pretrial restraint
of substitute assets is possible in fraud cases, either under the RICO statute or
under the general criminal forfeiture statute.42 As a result, the Department of
Justice has recommended legislation authorizing the pretrial restraint of substitute
assets in all criminal cases.
The conflict in the United States over preservation of substitute assets pretrial
emphasizes the simplicity of the U.K. system. The British courts are not concerned
with whether the assets represent actual proceeds of the crime; any asset may be
used to satisfy a confiscation order, and consequently any asset may be restrained
pretrial.
III. United Kingdom Confiscation Laws
The United Kingdom has taken a tough stance on taking the profit out of crime.
With the enactment of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, the Criminal
Justice Act 1988, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989, and the Proceeds of
Crime Act 1995, the courts have broad powers to restrain and confiscate criminal
proceeds.
The courts in the United Kingdom have had the ability to confiscate the proceeds
of fraud and other nondrug offenses since April 1, 1989, when the Criminal
Justice Act 1988 entered into force. The Act provided for confiscation orders
in nondrug cases upon conviction if the defendant benefited from the offense by
at least £10,000.1
3
This legislation gave the courts broad confiscation powers but it had some
limitations. The first was that the court's power was discretionary. Also, the
minimum benefit, i.e., the value of the stolen property or the amount of pecuniary
gain from the offense, had to exceed £10,000. With the enactment of the 1995
Proceeds of Crime Act on November 1, 1995, the courts' powers were enhanced.
First, the court is directed to enter confiscation orders in all indictable cases, if
41. 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1)(B) provides that in cases of mail fraud forfeiture is governed by 21
U.S.C. § 413(b), (c), (e), and (g) through (p) (the narcotics forfeiture provisions). Section 853(a)
only refers to property associated with the crime. A separate provision, § 853(p), allows forfeiture
of substitute assets postconviction. Section 853 does not specify that pretrial restraint of substitute
assets is permitted.
42. Compare United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1994) (pretrial restraint not
permitted); United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1993) (pretrial restraint not permitted);
In re Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1993) (pretrial restraint not permitted under RICO);
with In re Billman, 915 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1990) (pretrial restraint permitted under RICO); and
United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988) (court should consider pretrial restraint under
RICO when restraining fruits of crime would be burden to third parties).
43. Criminal Justice Act 1988, ch. 33, § 71(7) (Eng.).
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requested by the prosecutor or if the court considers it appropriate." Second,
the £10,000 threshold is removed. Third, in specified cases the court can make
assumptions that property received for the six years preceding conviction repre-
sents criminal proceeds.45 In such cases, the court may assume that any property
in the defendant's possession at the date of conviction, any expenditures made
by the defendant, or any property transferred to or received by the defendant
within the past six years4 represents the proceeds of crime-up to the assessed
value of the defendant's benefit from such criminal conduct.47 These assumptions
are designed to attack "lifestyle" criminals, who make their living from criminal
activity, but in fact are broad enough to cover someone convicted of two minor
theft offenses.4
The rights of victims to bring civil actions are not impeded. If a victim "has
instituted, or intends to institute, civil proceedings against the defendant in respect
of loss, injury or damage sustained in connection with that conduct-(a) the court
shall have a power, instead of a duty, to make an order under this section .... -49
The advantage of permitting the prosecutor or the court to seek a confiscation order,
even if the victim is considering or intends to institute civil proceedings, is that the
prosecutor can restrain and preserve assets that might otherwise be dissipated prior
to the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. Thus, the victim will have the benefit
of restraint and receivership orders.
A. RESTRAINT ORDERS
As in the United States, restraint orders can be sought before trial to preserve
assets. Application for a restraint order is an ex parte proceeding.5° Charges do
not have to be filed, but the prosecution must establish that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a confiscation order may be made against the defendant.
44. Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, ch. 11, para. I (Eng.), amends § 71 of the 1988 Act as follows:
(1) Where an offender is convicted, in any proceedings before the Crown Court or
a magistrates' court, of an offence of a relevant description, it shall be the duty of
the court [to enter a confiscation order]-
(a) if the prosecutor has given written notice to the court that he considers that
it would be appropriate for the court to proceed under this section, or
(b) if the court considers, even though it has not been given such notice, that it
would be appropriate for it so to proceed ...
45. The assumptions apply in cases where the defendant is convicted of at least two qualifying
offenses or where the defendant is convicted of one qualifying offense and has been convicted of a
qualifying offense on a previous occasion. A "qualifying offence" is one committed after commence-
ment of the Act from which the defendant benefited. Criminal Justice Act 1988, § 72AA(2) (Eng).
46. From the date the proceedings were instituted. Id. § 72AA(7)(b).
47. Id. § 72AA, para. (3).
48. The assumptions will only apply to offenses committed after November 1, 1995, the date
the Act entered into force.
49. Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, ch. 11, § 71, para. (1C) (Eng.).
50. See ANDREW R. MITCHELL, MARTIN G. HINTON & SUSAN M.E. TAYLOR ON CONFISCATION
30-31 (1992).
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Unlike Mareva injunctions, discussed below, which provide for prejudgment
restraint in civil cases, the prosecution does not have to give an undertaking for
damages to get a restraint order.
The restraint order is an in personam order against the defendant or anyone
else named in the order who is holding property on his or her behalf. Thus, the
restraint order may apply to worldwide assets, i.e., any property of the defendant
or in which the defendant has an interest, and may restrain any person such as
nominees, trustees, companies, spouses from dealing with any asset in which
the defendant has an interest, even before charges are filed. 5 In some instances,
the prosecution may ask the court to appoint a receiver to maintain the property,
or sell it if it is a depreciating asset, and hold the property or proceeds in trust
until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.
The restraint order may be a general one or it may restrain specific property.
If it is a general order, provisions must be made for living expenses and attorney's
fees. 52 A restraint order in criminal cases is closely analogous to a Mareva injunc-
tion in civil cases. "In both cases the object is to strike a balance at an interlocutory
stage between keeping assets available to satisfy a final order, if and when one
is made, and meeting the reasonable requirements of their owner in the mean-
time."- 53 Failure to comply with a restraint order is contempt of court and is
punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both.
B. CONFISCATION ORDERS
A confiscation order is a separate order issued by the Crown Court after
conviction. In the United Kingdom, confiscation orders are not part of the sentenc-
ing process. The purpose of a confiscation order is to put the defendant in the
position the defendant would have been in had the defendant not offended.54
Thus, confiscation is in addition to, not in lieu of, any other sentence (in direct
contrast to U.S. forfeiture orders, which are regarded as punishment and part
of the sentence). The court may postpone entry of a confiscation order until after
sentencing. 55 However, if postponement occurs, the court cannot sentence the
defendant to a monetary order until after a confiscation determination is made
because a confiscation order is to be paid before payment of a fine. For drug
trafficking offenses, the confiscation hearing must be before sentencing.
51. Id. at 35-36; see also In re Peters, [1988] 1 Q.B. 871 (Eng. C.A.).
52. In re Peters, [1988] 1 Q.B. 871 (Eng. C.A.) (the Court of Appeal upheld modification of
restraint order for payment of son's educational expenses and defendant's legal fees. The original
restraint order already gave the defendant permission to draw on a named bank account to make the
mortgage payments on his house).
53. Id. at 880.
54. In re T, W.L.R. 949 (C.A. 1993).
55. Criminal Justice Act 1993, ch. 36, § 28 (Eng.), amending § 72 of the Criminal Justice Act
1988.
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A confiscation order is not directed at specific property. Rather, it is a money
judgment based on the amount of benefit accruing to the defendant as a result
of the criminal activity. In determining whether to enter a confiscation order,
the court must first determine whether the defendant has benefited from the crime
and, if so, the value of that benefit. The court then determines the assets, i.e.,
realizable property, available to satisfy the order. The confiscation order is entered
for the amount benefited or the value of the realizable property, whichever is
lower. In determining the amount of realizable property, any property of the
defendant, e.g., the family home, can be taken into account. No tracing is required
so the property does not have to be shown as purchased with proceeds of the
offense. Also, gifts made by the defendant to any other person are included.56
The burden of proof is on the defendant to show the amount of realizable property
is less than the amount benefited. 7 Both the prosecution and the defendant can
apply for a variation of the confiscation order. Under the Proceeds of Crime Act
1995, the prosecution can apply for upward variation of an existing order, or
seek a confiscation order if none was made, up to six years after conviction if
further evidence becomes available to prove benefit from the offense.5" The
defendant can seek a downward variation by applying to the High Court for a
certificate of inadequacy. If this certificate is issued, the defendant may apply
to the Crown Court for the balance of the order to be reduced.5 9
The standard of proof for determining whether the defendant has benefited
from the offense is the civil standard, the balance of probabilities, for defendants
charged on or after February 3, 1995. 60 For offenses charged prior to that date,
the Criminal Justice Act 1988 requires the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
1. Enforcement of Confiscation Orders
A confiscation order is different from a forfeiture order in that title passes
immediately upon entry of the forfeiture order.61 (In the United States, title is
56. Regina v. Smith, [1996] Crim. L.R. 329 (C.A. 1995), holding that
although a judge cannot make an order against a defendant in relation to assets which
he does not have, it was open to him to make an order against a defendant in relation
to a disposal by way of gift ... even though ... the donee has, by whatever route,
disposed of the gift.
Nonetheless, the court quashed the confiscation order because the donee's statement as to what
had happened to the proceeds of sale of the gift from the defendant was accepted and "[n]o evidence
was called." Thus, it would be unjust, the judge having accepted that account, to impose a confiscation
order in relation to the gift.
57. Regina v. Carroll, [1991] 13 Crim. App. 99 (C.A.).
58. Upward variation is also possible under the Drug Trafficking Act 1994, § 16.
59. In re Regina v. Walbrook, [1994] 15 Crim. App. 783 (C.A.) (the burden is on the defendant
to satisfy the court by clear and cogent evidence that the amount to be realized is less than the benefit).
60. Criminal Justice Act 1993, ch. 36, § 27 (amending § 71 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988).
61. Forfeiture orders are entered in the United Kingdom for cash seized at the borders pursuant
to § 25 of the Criminal Justice (International Co-Operation) Act 1990, ch. 5 (Eng.), or to seize the
resources of terrorist organizations or money laundered for terrorist organizations under the Preven-
tion of Terrorism Act (Temporary Provisions) 1989, ch. 4, § 13(2) (Eng.).
SPRING 1997
16 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
deemed to vest with the United States at the time of the commission of the offense.)
Title is not transferred upon entry of a confiscation order. Only as money is paid
in to satisfy the order can the court take control of the asset and transfer the
funds to Treasury. Accordingly, entry of a confiscation order does not give the
prosecution or the police the ability to seize assets to satisfy the order. Instead,
if the order is not paid within the specified time, the prosecution can apply for
appointment of a receiver (usually a private accountant appointed at the recom-
mendation of the Crown Prosecution Service) to liquidate the defendant's assets.
The Crown Prosecution Service may also refer the case to the administrative
section of the magistrate's court, which will obtain garnishee orders or distress
warrants (e.g., an order to sell a car or other asset).
A receiver has the power to take or sell any asset to satisfy the order. A receiver
can be appointed to confiscate assets and hold them in abeyance until the appeal
is over. The order appointing a receiver usually includes a catch-all phrase to
give the receiver power to take "any realizable property," in case additional
property is identified later. 62 If a receiver is appointed at the restraint stage to
manage assets, a duty is owed to the court to protect the assets and to the defendant
to preserve them at their greatest value.63
The receiver can seek the defendant's cooperation by including language in
the order that the defendant must cooperate with the receiver in liquidating the
assets. The defendants are then faced with contempt if they fail to do so. Receivers
have been able to get powers of attorney in this way, or repatriation of overseas
assets by the defendants. The defendants are likely to get more value for their
assets if they cooperate with the receiver. Under both the Criminal Justice Act
1988 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, the court cannot take the confiscation
order into account in imposing a sentence, even though there is a possibility of
imprisonment for default. 64 And even if a defendant is imprisoned for failure to
pay the confiscation order, the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 does not wipe out
the debt; the defendant will still be liable. 6' This framework is in direct contrast
to the Supreme Court's holding in Austin, that imposition of civil forfeiture
following conviction may violate the Excessive Fines Clause. Of course, the
U.K. order is not disproportionate; it is limited to the amount by which the
defendant benefited.
62. The Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, ch. 11, § 10 (Eng.), amends § 83 of the Criminal Justice
Act 1988 to permit variation of a confiscation order upon application by a receiver.
63. A management receiver is appointed by the court pursuant to § 77(8) of the Criminal Justice
Act 1988.
64. If the defendant defaults, the sentence is two years for orders between £50,000 and £100,000;
three years for orders between £100,000 and £250,000; and five years for orders totalling £250,000
to £1 million.
65. Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, ch. 11, § 8, amending ch. 33, § 75 of the Criminal Justice
Act 1988.
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2. Enforcement of Forfeiture Orders in the United States
In the United States, the defendant may be required, as part of a plea agreement,
to liquidate overseas assets and repatriate the proceeds to the United States for
forfeiture. This requirement puts the responsibility on the defendant and saves
the government the cost of liquidation and maintenance. In addition, there may
be restrictions on the U.S. government's ability to own or sell foreign property.
Requiring the defendant to liquidate the property eliminates these problems.
Unlike in the United Kingdom, a receiver is not appointed to liquidate the prop-
erty; and the burden falls on the government because the property is transferred
immediately upon entry of the order. Thus, the government has no leverage
against the defendant after the forfeiture order is entered. In the United Kingdom,
as discussed above, the liquidator can obtain a court order to secure the defendant's
cooperation, and failure to comply is punishable by contempt. In the United
States, if the plea agreement does not provide for repatriation or if the court does
not order it, the United States must seek assistance from the foreign government
in enforcing a forfeiture order or repatriating the assets.
The court can order the defendant to repatriate assets pursuant to a protective
order or a sentencing order even if the defendant is not cooperative. A defendant
may be ordered to repatriate funds from foreign bank accounts pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 982, which empowers the court to take any action to preserve the
availability of forfeitable property. 66 Specifically, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 982(b)(1), which incorporates the narcotics-related provisions of 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(e)(1)(A), the government can seek a protective order directing the defendant
to repatriate funds from foreign banks to the jurisdiction of the U.S. court pending
the outcome of the forfeiture proceeding where funds that the government alleges
are subject to forfeiture have been transferred outside the United States after the
indictment.
3. Enforcement of Foreign Confiscation Orders
The United Kingdom can enforce foreign confiscation orders in fraud cases
under the Criminal Justice (International Co-Operation) Act 1990.67 Section 9
provides that overseas forfeiture orders may be enforced in the United Kingdom
where there is an Order in Council. Restraint orders may also be enforced pursuant
66. See United States v. Lopez, 688 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (defendants ordered to execute
release needed to transfer foreign funds subject to forfeiture); United States v. Sellers, 848 F. Supp.
73 (E.D. La. 1994); United States v. Rutgard, Case No. 94-408-GT, Order dated January 24, 1995
(S.D. Ca.) (defendant ordered to repatriate funds from Isle of Man to registry of U.S. District Court
pending conclusion of trial and forfeiture determination. Funds were subsequently forfeited upon
conviction).
67. The Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act 1990 (Eng.) entered into force
April 5, 1990.
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to the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995.68 This provision was extended to the United
States on August 1, 1994, thus allowing the United Kingdom to enforce U.S.
restraint and forfeiture orders in criminal cases. The United States can enforce
foreign forfeiture orders in drug cases pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B) if
the offense is punishable by more than one year and would be punishable by
more than one year in the United States, had the conduct occurred in the United
States, and a certified copy of the foreign forfeiture order is evidence of probable
cause pursuant to section 981(h)(3).
C. COMPENSATION OF VICTIMS
Courts in the United Kingdom may award compensation to victims of crime
under the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973. Section 35 provides that courts
in the United Kingdom are empowered to order persons convicted of an offense
"to pay compensation for any personal injury, loss or damage resulting from
that offence or any other offence which is taken into consideration by the court
in determining sentence .... - 69 If appropriate, compensation must be considered
before imposition of a fine.
A compensation order can be imposed in addition to a confiscation order and
is entered before or during the criminal proceeding, not after the trial as in
confiscation cases. Unlike a confiscation order, which is imposed in addition to
the sentence on an offender, a compensation order may be in addition to or instead
of any other sentence. If there are insufficient funds to pay both, the compensation
order is paid first.70
In R. v. Edward Albert Hunter,7 1 the court ordered that a compensation order
be paid out of realizable property where funds were insufficient to satisfy both
orders. The trustee in bankruptcy argued that to use the confiscation procedures
for the ulterior purpose of making a compensation order would give the victims
preferential treatment over the creditors in bankruptcy. The court held, however,
that "[T]he aims of confiscating ill-gotten gains on the one hand and of returning
them to the victim on the other are about as complementary as can be. One would
68. Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, ch. 11, § 14(3).
69. Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, ch. 62, § 35 (1974) (Eng.).
70. Criminal Justice Act 1988, ch. 33, § 72(7).
Where-
(a) a court makes both a confiscation order and an order for the payment of compensa-
tion under section 35 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 against the same
person in the same proceedings; and
(b) it appears to the court that he will not have sufficient means to satisfy both the
orders in full, it shall direct that so much of the compensation as will not in its opinion
be recoverable because of the insufficiency of his means shall be paid out of any sums
recovered under the confiscation order.
71. Southwark Crown Court Order No. T94 0361 dated 10 October 1994.
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expect them to be considered together, and the Court's powers to be used to that
end."
72
The Home Office Victim's Charter provides that the police are required to
obtain information on the victim's injury or loss and provide it to the Crown
Prosecution Service for presentation to the court, and the courts are required to
give reasons why compensation orders are not made if they could have been.73
The practice of the police is to obtain a statement of loss from the victims in
fraud cases and provide a schedule to the Crown Prosecution Service to consider
whether a compensation order should be sought.
The Crown Prosecution Service may seek both a confiscation and a compensa-
tion order, which allows pretrial restraint of assets. However, if the defendant
is acquitted, the restraining order will be dissolved, and the victim would at that
time have to obtain a civil restraint order and file a civil claim against the defen-
dant. In cases where the criminal case is dismissed, the victim may not have
sufficient evidence to seek a civil restraint order because the prosecution's evi-
dence will not be a matter of public record and the police may be unable to share
evidence from the criminal case with the victim.
74
D. RESTITUTION ORDERS
In the United States, the court is not required to award restitution to the
victims. The court may impose a fine or enter a forfeiture order. Unlike in
the United Kingdom, the U.S. courts are not required to give reasons if a
restitution order is not entered, and no law requires that restitution be paid
first. The general restitution statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) (the Victim and
Witness Protection Act), provides: "The court, when sentencing a defendant
...may order, in addition to or, in the case of misdemeanor, in lieu of any
other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any
victim of such offense ....
However, the court may decline to order restitution if to do so would unduly
complicate and prolong the sentencing process75 or the victim has received or is
to receive compensation. If the victim is compensated, the court may order restitu-
tion to any person who has compensated the victim for such loss.
7 6
In 1994, Congress enacted the Senior Citizens Against Marketing Scams Act,77
which requires mandatory restitution for telemarketing fraud, defined as induce-
72. Id. at 16.
73. Home Office, Victim's Charter, A Statement of the Rights of Victims of Crime, Feb. 22,
1990, at 7, 18.
74. See Marcel v. Commissioner of Police, [1992] 2 W.L.R. 50 (C.A. 1991), [1991] 1 All E.R.
845.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A)(ii).
76. Id. § 3663(e)(1); United States v. Cloud, 872 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1989) (insurance company
entitled to restitution).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2327 (1994).
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ment of the purchase of goods or services through telephone calls. However, if
the court finds that the economic circumstances of the defendant make restitution
of the full amount unlikely in the foreseeable future, the court may order a nominal
restitution amount.78
Restitution is part of the criminal sentence. In United States v. Ramilo the
court stated that "[t]he judge must balance the victim's need for compensation
against the other goals of sentencing, including rehabilitation." 79 If restitution
is ordered, it must be paid by the end of the period of probation, if ordered, or
within five years after the end of the term of imprisonment imposed, if probation
is not ordered. If not otherwise provided by the court, the restitution must be
paid immediately.° The government has the burden of demonstrating the amount
of loss to the victim, and restitution is limited to actual losses incurred by identifi-
able victims.8'
Even if restitution is awarded, the Supreme Court held in Hughey v. United
States82 that restitution is to be awarded only for those offenses for which the
defendant has been convicted. The reason for this holding is that the defendant
is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the amount of restitution
can be determined. 83 Thus, in a case with hundreds of victims, the entire fraudulent
scheme and the total losses must be alleged in the indictment in order to seek
restitution for all the victims. In cases where a defendant pleads guilty, the courts
are split on whether a restitution order may encompass the entire fraud alleged
in the indictment or only the specific counts to which the defendant pleaded
guilty.1
4
Congress amended the Victim and Witness Protection Act after Hughey to
clarify that in a conspiracy or a scheme to defraud, or pattern of criminal activity,
78. See United States v. Porter, 41 F.3d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 1994).
79. 986 F.2d 333, 336 (9th Cir. 1993).
80. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3664.
81. Id. § 3663(e)(2).
82. 495 U.S. 411 (1990). In Hughey, the defendant was ordered to pay restitution for losses
stemming from his unlawful use of 21 credit cards, although he pleaded guilty to the fraudulent use
of only one of those cards. The Supreme Court held that restitution could only be ordered for the
conduct underlying the conviction and not for other acts.
83. United States v. Schiek, 806 F.2d 943, 944 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032
(1987); United States v. Weir, 861 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089 (1989).
84. See United States v. Levy, 992 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1993) (court erred in ordering restitution
in excess of loss alleged in two counts of embezzlement forming basis for guilty plea); United States
v. Parrot, 992 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1993) (court may only award restitution for the amount of loss
specified in the counts to which the defendant pleads guilty unless the plea agreement specifies
otherwise); United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1992) (award of restitution must be
based on amount of losses to victims caused by the counts to which the defendant pleaded guilty);
United States v. Bailey, 975 F.2d 1028 (4th Cir. 1992) (award of $16.2 million proper where
indictment alleged scheme to defraud investors of in excess of $15 million and defendant pleaded
guilty to entire indictment); United States v. Turino, 978 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S. 975 (1993) (restitution order based on entire fraudulent scheme upheld even though defendant
pleaded guilty to only two counts of fraud where those counts explicitly reference the broader scheme).
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a victim "means ... any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal
conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.'- 85 Thus, a court
now has the power to award restitution beyond that permitted by Hughey, so
that all victims, not just those named in the indictment, are eligible for restitution
if the entire fraudulent scheme is alleged in the indictment.
8 6
The court may order payment of a fine as well as restitution, but payments
shall first be used to satisfy the restitution order.87 In determining whether to
award restitution, the court shall consider the amount of loss to the victim, the
defendant's financial resources and earning ability, and any other factors the
court deems appropriate. In United States v. Mahoney,88 the court of appeals
overturned a restitution order when the trial court failed to consider the defendant's
ability to pay and the needs of his family when ordering restitution of an amount
nine times his annual salary to be paid within five years. However, indigent
defendants may be ordered to pay restitution, provided there is a likelihood they
will acquire assets in the future, and the order may be reversed in the event
future circumstances make its enforcement impossible or Draconian.89
As stated, restitution orders in the United States are viewed as a means of
punishing and rehabilitating defendants, and victims have no control over the
decision to award restitution or to challenge a failure by the court to do so. 90
This outcome is based on the longstanding principle that third parties have no
right to participate in or to object to the government's enforcement of the law
through the criminal justice process. 9 The court does not have the authority to
award restitution out of forfeited funds. Upon entry of an order of forfeiture,
title passes to the United States, and the attorney general has the authority to
award restitution out of forfeited funds. Title 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(6), provides
that "the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Postal Service
as the case may be, is authorized to . . .restore forfeited property to any victim
of an offense.. .. " The offense must be one described in the statute, and includes
fraud, theft, and embezzlement offenses involving federal financial institutions,
fraudulent loan applications to U.S. federal agencies, counterfeiting or forgery
of U.S. securities or postage, and customs violations. The statute thus provides
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2), amendment effective November 29, 1990.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1422 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 920 (1995).
87. United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, Nov. 1, 1995, § 5E1.l(c).
88. 859 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. McClellan, 868 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.
1989); United States v. Gomer, 764 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1985).
89. See United States v. Clemmons, 48 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ramilo,
986 F.2d 333, 335 (9th Cir. 1993), and cases cited therein.
90. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986) ("the victim has no control over the amount of
restitution award or over the decision to award restitution"); see also United States v. Cloud, 872
F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Grundhoefer, 916 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1990).
91. Grundhoefer, 916 F.2d at 792.
SPRING 1997
22 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
for restitution where the victim is a federally insured bank or a U.S. government
agency or the crime involves use of a federal financial institution; however, it
does not provide a basis for restitution to private parties in all cases. Moreover, this
provision is discretionary, just as a restitution order by the court is discretionary.
The RICO forfeiture statute,92 which was used in the BCCI case, also gives
the attorney general the authority to restore forfeited property to victims of an
offense. In the BCCI case, BCCI, through its court-appointed liquidator, pleaded
guilty in January 1992, and agreed to the forfeiture of all of BCCI's assets in
the United States.93 More than $550 million has been ordered forfeited, 94 and
the United States Department of Justice has identified nearly a billion dollars in
forfeitable assets. The recovery far exceeded any losses suffered by U.S. deposi-
tors or the U.S. government, and accordingly, the plea agreement provided that
50 percent of the forfeited funds would be placed in a Worldwide Victims Fund.
In September 1995, $223 million was transferred to the court-appointed liquida-
tors in London for distribution to the innocent depositors.95 The provision included
in the BCCI Plea Agreement that half the forfeited funds would be returned to
the victims was unusual. However, the Department of Justice is promulgating
new guidelines for remission of forfeited funds to victims.
IV. Civil Recovery Actions
A. MAREVA INJUNCTIONS
Like the laws on criminal confiscation, the U.K. laws on civil recovery are
broader than those in the United States. However, victims' ability to bring private
actions may depend on whether they have sufficient resources to hire private
counsel. Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom does not have contingent
fee cases. A victim may discover that legal costs will be higher than the amount
of money stolen. Even though costs will be awarded if the action is successful,
a victim may not have the funds to bring the action in the first place. As a result,
most of the civil recovery actions are brought by large organizations such as
banks and insurance companies.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(g)(1) provides that the attorney general is authorized to "restore forfeited
property to victims of a violation of this chapter, or take any other action to protect the rights of
innocent persons which is in the interest of justice and which is not inconsistent with the provisions
of this chapter .. "
93. See also United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., Order of Forfeiture dated
January 24, 1992, 1992 WL 100334; Order and First Supplemental List of Forfeited Property dated
January 31, 1992; United States District Court forthe District of Columbia, Criminal Number9l-0655
(JHG); and Order of Forfeiture and Second Supplemental List of Forfeited Property dated July 29,
1992, 795 F. Supp. 477 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
94. BCCI pleaded guilty on January 19, 1992, to operating a racketeering conspiracy in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
95. As of November 1, 1995, the BCCI depositors had not received any distribution from the
U.S. funds or from any other funds recovered by the court-appointed liquidators.
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Civil actions are based on the decision in the Mareva96 case, which granted
an injunction preventing a defendant from disposing of assets upon a showing
that the plaintiff was likely to recover a judgment. In Mareva, the shipowners
of the vessel Mareva brought an action against the charterers, who had subchart-
ered the vessel to the president of India. The Indian High Commission paid the
charterers for the freight, a load of fertilizer, but the charterers defaulted on the
last payment to the shipowners and claimed that they did not have the funds to
pay for the hire of the vessel. Lord Denning granted the order based on section
45(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, stating that
"[i]f it appears that the debt is due and owing-and there is a danger that the
debtor may dispose of his assets so as to defeat it before judgment-the Court
has jurisdiction in a proper case to grant an interlocutory judgment so as to
prevent him disposing of those assets." 97
Although considered an exceptional remedy, based on discretion, this began
what Lord Denning later referred to as "the greatest piece of judicial law reform
in my time." 98 The general principles for a grant of a Mareva injunction are:
(i) The plaintiff should make full and frank disclosure of all matters in his knowledge
which are material for the judge to know.
(ii) The plaintiff should give particulars of his claim against the defendant, stating the
ground of his claim and the amount thereof, and fairly stating the points made against
it by the defendant.
(iii) The plaintiff should give some grounds for believing that the defendant has assets
here....
(iv) The plaintiff should give some grounds for believing that there is a risk of the
assets being removed before the judgment or award is satisfied. 99
A Mareva injunction may be entered against the defendant or a third person
holding assets on the defendant's behalf and it may apply to worldwide assets.
The court also has the power to order the defendant to provide information about
assets, wherever located.'00 Third parties may also be compelled to disclose
information about fraudulently obtained assets.'°'
In Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier,'O° the Court of Appeal upheld a worldwide
Mareva injunction against Jean-Claude Duvalier, his wife, and his mother pre-
venting them from disposing of assets, wherever located, that represented funds
96. Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers S.A., [19751 2 Lloyd's Rep.
509 (C.A.).
97. Id. at 510.
98. RT. HON. LORD DENNING, THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW 134 (London ed., Butterworth &
Co. Ltd., 1980).
99. Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine S.A., [1979] 1 Q.B. 645,668 (C.A.) (citations
omitted).
100. A.J. Bekhor & Co. Ltd. v. Bilton, [1981] 1 Q.B. 923, 936-37 (C.A.). The court has the
power "to make all such ancillary orders ... as appeared to the court to be just and convenient to
ensure that the exercise of the Mareva jurisdiction was effective to achieve its purpose." Id. at 924.
101. Bankers Trust Co. v. Shapira, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1274 (C.A.).
102. [1990] 1 Q.B. 202 (C.A.).
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allegedly embezzled from the Republic of Haiti. The Republic of Haiti filed
proceedings in France to recover $120 million and then sought a restraining order
in England and an order compelling the defendants to disclose information relating
to their assets. Although the Duvaliers did not reside in England, the court con-
cluded that "there is jurisdiction to grant a Mareva injunction, pending trial,
over assets worldwide," 103 although cases where it will be applied are rare.
The Mareva injunction was granted even though the defendants did not reside
in England because the court felt that
[w]hat . . . is determinative is the plain and admitted intention of the defendants to
move their assets out of the reach of the courts of law, coupled with the resources they
have obtained and the skill they have hitherto shown in doing that, and the vast amount
of money involved. This case demands international co-operation between all nations."'4
The court noted that
if the Duvalier family have a defence to the substantive claim, and feel that they are
being persecuted, then their remedy, as I have said, is to co-operate in securing an
early trial of the dispute. It is not to secrete their assets where even the most just decision
in the world cannot reach them.1
0 5
The disclosure order was also granted. The defendants were served with a
summons seeking disclosure relating to assets, which they sought to dismiss on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal upheld disclosure to permit
inspection of documents and disclosure of information relating to their assets
wherever they might be.
A civil recovery action may be successful even if the defendants are acquitted.
Such was the case in the Brink's Mat robbery, where gold bullion worth at least
£25 million was stolen at a warehouse at Heathrow Airport in November 1983.
Brinks Mat filed a civil ex parte application in December 1986, and obtained an
injunction restraining assets of nine defendants. Brinks Mat also filed a civil suit
for damages for wrongful interference with stolen gold, damages for conspiracy
to injure the plaintiffs, and declarations that certain assets were the proceeds of
the sale of, or profits made from the use of, stolen gold and were held on trust
for the plaintiffs. The Civil Suit was filed prior to commencement of the criminal
prosecutions. 106
In the Brink's Mat case, the civil investigators 1' were able to trace some of
the stolen funds early in the case. These funds provided a source of funds to
further the investigation and locate additional assets. A cooperating defendant
signed consent orders for disclosure of his Swiss bank accounts, which aided
in the investigation. The police were able to obtain information from the civil
103. Id. at 215.
104. Id. at 216-17.
105. Id. at 217.
106. See Brink's Mat Ltd. v. Elcombe, [19881 1 W.L.R. 1350 (C.A.).
107. The civil recovery was handled by Bishop International, Ltd., London.
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investigators pursuant to a Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)
Order. ,08
In some cases, a civil Mareva action may overlap with a criminal prosecution.
In such cases, the court may stay the civil proceeding until conclusion of the
criminal case to avoid prejudice to the defendant.'09
B. PRIVATE PROSECUTIONS
Another new development is the bringing of private prosecutions in cases
where the Crown Prosecution Service or the Serious Fraud Office has declined
to prosecute. The bondholders in Barings filed a private prosecution against
Nicholas Leeson in the City of London Magistrates Court alleging losses of £50
million and claiming a substantial public interest in trying the case in London
because the losses were suffered in London. Leeson was charged in Singapore,
and for this reason the Serious Fraud Office opposed the private action. The
court agreed and deferred to the Government of Singapore. A person bringing
a private prosecution may request access to government files under the Proceeds
of Crime Act 1995. Section 93J provides that "the High Court may, on an
application by the person appearing to the court to have the conduct of any
prosecution, order any material [relating to a defendant's realizable property]
... which is in the possession of an authorized government department to be
produced to the court within such period as the court may specify.' ' 110
C. CIVIL RECOVERY ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Victims may also file private actions in the United States to recover fraud
proceeds. In the BCCI case, the trustee for First American Bank filed a civil
RICO lawsuit,"' which carries a penalty of treble damages, plus costs and attor-
ney's fees. In settlement of the civil RICO case and in return for other assurances,
the Abu Dhabi majority shareholders agreed to forfeit and withdraw their claims
to approximately $450 million in claims and property and to share documents
with U.S. investigators.
Although not as widely used as Mareva injunctions, preliminary injunctions
have been granted in civil RICO cases to prevent dissipation of assets. In a civil
RICO action brought by the Republic of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals
108. PACE § 9 and Schedule I permit a constable to apply to a circuit judge for a production
order for documents and records for the purposes of a criminal investigation. See VAUGHAN BEVAN
& KEN LIDSTONE, THE INVESTIGATION OF CRIME.... A GUIDE TO POLICE POWERS 165, 556-57
(1991).
109. See In re DPR Futures Ltd, [1989] 5 BCC 603 (civil proceedings stayed because media
publicity would result in real risk of prejudice to the respondents' right to a fair trial); see also DR.
MICHAEL LEVI, CUSTOMER CONFIDENTIALITY, MONEY-LAUNDERING, AND POLICE-BANK RELATION-
SHIPS 49 (The Police Foundation, London 1991).
110. Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, § 93J(1) (Eng.).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
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for the Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction restraining assets of deposed
leader Ferdinand Marcos, his wife, and others. 1 12 The Republic of the Philippines
sought an injunction enjoining the Marcoses from disposing of any of their assets,
including real estate worth $4 million in Beverly Hills, California, $800,000 on
deposit at a bank in California, and $7 million in money, jewels, and property
transported to Hawaii by the Marcoses when they left the Philippines.
The Republic alleged that Marcos abused his position of power to convert
government funds to his personal use and established that the Marcoses had bank
accounts in Switzerland of approximately $1.3 billion, notwithstanding that their
total salaries from 1966 to 1985 were less than $800,000. Marcos argued that
the act of state doctrine barred the suit. The Court held that while the act of state
doctrine might be applicable to prevent judicial challenge in U.S. courts of acts
of a dictator in power, "[n]o estoppel exists insulating a deposed dictator from
accounting. . . . The doctrine is meant to facilitate the foreign relations of the
United States, not to furnish the equivalent of sovereign immunity to a deposed
leader." 113 Like the U.K. court in the Duvalier case, the court enjoined the
disposal of the worldwide assets, not just those assets in the United States, holding
that -[b]ecause the injunction operates in personam, not in rem, there is no
reason to be concerned about its territorial reach. -1 14
In a civil RICO and securities fraud case, Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson &
Co.," 5 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a district court had the power
to issue a preliminary injunction against a securities firm and its president to
protect a potential future damages claim. The preliminary injunction prevented
the defendants from transferring funds overseas and ordered the president to
repatriate funds he had transferred overseas since the litigation had commenced.
The court of appeals vacated the order, however, and remanded the case because
the district court did not tailor the injunction to the expected recovery. The order
encumbered all of the assets of the defendants, worth tens of millions of dollars. ",
6
The defendants argued that the district court did not have the power to issue a
preliminary injunction to protect a future damages remedy. The court of appeals
disagreed, noting that although not necessarily appropriate in a run-of-the-mill
damages action, the injunction was appropriate upon a showing that the plaintiffs
were likely to become entitled to the encumbered funds and that without the
injunction plaintiffs would be unlikely to recover. The court of appeals agreed
112. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1035 (1989).
113. 862 F.2d at 1360-61.
114. Id. at 1364; see also United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 384 (1964) ("Once
personal jurisdiction of a party is obtained, the District Court has authority to order it to 'freeze'
property under its control, whether the property be within or without the United States.").
115. 903 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1990).
116. A default judgment was later entered against the defendants for $73 million. Hoxworth v.
Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1990).
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with the district court that the criteria for a preliminary injunction-the likelihood
of success on the merits and the probability of irreparable harm if the relief
were not granted-had been met, concluding that an unsatisfied money judgment
constitutes an irreparable injury.
Most of the other circuits have also held that a preliminary injunction is available
to prevent dissipation of assets in order to protect an eventual money judgment. 117
D. COSTS IN CIVIL RECOVERY ACTIONS
The costs of civil recovery actions can be exorbitant. In the BCCI case, the
liquidators' costs as of December 1994, were £169.2 million, plus £5 million
in travel and subsistence expenses."' In addition, legal advisers to the liquidators
had been paid £40 million as of September 1994."9 In the United States, part
of the settlement with the Abu Dhabi parties in the civil RICO action included
a transfer of $50 million from the sale of the shares to First American Bank for
litigation costs. 20 Costs as of June 30, 1994, totaled $4.2 million. 121 What will
happen to the remainder of the $50 million set aside for litigation costs remains
unclear-whether the excess amount will inure to the benefit of First American
Bank, will be returned to the Worldwide Victims Fund, or will be eaten up in
additional litigation costs against the remaining parties to the civil lawsuit. In
the Maxwell case, costs incurred by the administrator were estimated at £30
million as of May 1995.122 These cases illustrate how excessive fees greatly
reduce the funds available to the victims of the fraud. This fact alone supports
increased efforts by courts and prosecutors to restrain and recover funds on behalf
of the victims.
E. COSTS IN CRIMINAL CONFISCATION CASES
In the United Kingdom, costs are usually assessed against the losing party.
However, the court refused an acquitted defendant's application for the costs of
challenging a restraint order on the grounds that to do so would deter the Crown
Prosecution Service from carrying out its duties.123 The court held that
Parliament, in creating the scheme of restraint orders and realization orders, is equipping
the courts themselves with a new range of weapons with which to tackle the evil of
117. See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1478-80 (9th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
118. ACCOUNTANCY AGE, May 19, 1994, at 2.
119. THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 18, 1994, at 19.
120. According to the trustee, this payment was to provide a fund to sustain the corporations'
efforts to seek compensation from the remaining defendants. The Trustee's Report to the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, dated Oct. 4, 1994, at 13.
121. Id. at 15.
122. Jon Ashworth, Creditors Go on Attack Over Advisors'Fees, THE TIMES, May 29, 1995, at
40.
123. In re Mason, 98 Crim. App. 31 (C.A. 1994).
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drug trafficking. I can see no conceivable value, given this Parliamentary intention,
in my ordering costs against the Crown Prosecution Service who ought not to be deterred
from its duty to make these applications for restraint orders to the court by the fear
that it may have to pay the costs of successful interveners in due course.124
However, meritorious interveners, in this case the defendant's wife, who was
not charged, may be entitled to costs. If the intervention is meritorious, "justice
requires . . . the party . . . should not be left simply to bear the costs when all
the intervener is doing is seeking to protect his or her property when he or she
is not a defendant in the criminal proceedings." '125
V. Disclosure and Confidentiality Laws
Recovering proceeds of crime depends on tracing the assets, which can prove
difficult when funds are moved offshore. Prosecutors and investigators need
access to two types of privileged information: (1) documentary evidence, e.g.,
bank records and company records, which are generally protected by confidential-
ity laws; and (2) testimony from the defendant and/or third parties, which may
be privileged based on bank secrecy laws or a legally recognized privilege such as
self-incrimination or attorney-client. In certain circumstances provisions permit
access to confidential and privileged information pursuant to statutes or common
law exceptions. However, the extent to which this information can be shared
with other investigatory or regulatory bodies varies and has been the subject of
extensive litigation.
In his report of the BCCI inquiry, Lord Justice Bingham recognized that prob-
lems of disclosure and confidentiality between regulatory and investigatory bodies
both domestically and internationally "raise difficult and intractable problems
of law, policy and practice, nationally and internationally. "12' As Lord Justice
Bingham so clearly noted,
Among regulatory authorities and other bodies discharging public functions in the UK
there is a certain tension between two commendable principles. One principle is that
information obtained for one purpose should not be used for another. This principle
is fortified by the practical consideration that if, as is desirable, members of the public
are to be frank and forthcoming with official authorities, they must be reassured that
the information they give will go no further. The other principle is that bodies set up
to pursue public ends regarded as important should not be required to operate in ignorance
of relevant information known to other public bodies but which those bodies are not
free to pass on. Evidence given to the Inquiry reveals no uniformity of law or practice
in reconciling these principles in the U.K., and it would be unrealistic to expect it.1
27
124. Id. at 40, 41.
125. Id. at 41.
126. The Right Honorable Lord Justice Bingham, Chairman, Inquiry into the Supervision of The
Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of
Commons (Oct. 22, 1992) at 187.
127. Id.
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A. CONFIDENTIALITY AND DIsCLOsuRE UNDER U.S. LAW
In the United States, bank and business records are not per se confidential.
A defendant in a criminal case can be required to produce personal or business
records or consent to the disclosure of bank records. The Supreme Court has
held that the records themselves are not protected. In United States v. Miller,"'
the Supreme Court held that individuals have no expectation of privacy in their
bank records. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
search and seizure does not protect against the disclosure of bank records located
in the United States. Following the decision in Miller, Congress enacted The
Right to Financial Privacy Act. 129 The Act does not prevent disclosure of bank
records, but requires notice to the customer prior to production of bank records
in response to a request from a federal government agency. Certain exceptions
include, e.g., in response to a grand jury subpoena; in connection with a judicial
proceeding in which the government and the customer are parties; and in emer-
gency situations where delay would cause imminent danger of physical injury,
serious property damage, or flight from prosecution. Notice is also not required
where the United States is acting in response to a request from a foreign authority
because the records are not being sought on behalf of a federal government
agency.130 Also, bank or business records are not protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. 31 Thus, an individual may be compelled
to execute a consent form for disclosure of foreign bank records without implicat-
ing the Fifth Amendment because the consent form is not "testimonial" in na-
ture, 132 and the records themselves are not protected. Foreign banks doing business
in the United States may be ordered to produce records located in foreign of-
fices. 133
Similarly, an individual's personal or business records are not privileged,
although the act of production might have testimonial implications and the govern-
ment would be precluded from using the defendant's production as a means of
authenticating the documents. In these cases, the government can grant "act of
production" immunity to secure the documents. 134 Moreover, the Fifth Amend-
128. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
129. 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1994).
130. Young v. United States Dep't of Justice, 882 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1989) (notice to customer
not required for letters rogatory request from the attorney general of Bermuda).
131. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974); United States v. Davis, 767
F.2d 1025, 1034 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (taxpayer
could be compelled to produce accountant's workpapers because workpapers not prepared by taxpayer
and contained no testimonial declaration by him)).
132. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988); United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 817
n.4 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984) ("[W]e find no incriminating testimony in the
contents of the directive or the fact that [the defendant] must sign.").
133. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Scotia), 691 F.2d 1384 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983); In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1215 (1983).
134. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
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ment only applies to individuals, so a corporation has no Fifth Amendment privi-
lege and records may be subpoenaed from a corporation without any grant of
immunity for the act of production.
Tax records may be shared by the Internal Revenue Service with U.S. criminal
prosecutors or foreign authorities pursuant to a court order. 135 Unlike in the
United Kingdom, where a witness may not always claim the privilege against
self-incrimination, a witness in a civil investigation in the United States may
claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination if the witness
can establish that fear of criminal prosecution is "substantial and 'real' " as
opposed to "trifling or imaginary." 136 However, witnesses' rights to be cautioned
that their answers may be used against them do not attach unless the witnesses
are interrogated in a "custodial situation.
' 131
In criminal investigations, the most common method of compelling production
of documents or testimony is through a grand jury subpoena. Many investigative
agencies also have authority to issue administrative subpoenas. Records obtained
pursuant to a grand jury subpoena, however, are subject to strict confidentiality
requirements. Grand jury material may be shared with U.S. civil agencies or
foreign prosecutors only if in connection with a judicial proceeding and only
pursuant to a court order. 38 A court order will only be entered upon a showing
of "particularized need.' ' 139 The government may seek a disclosure order to
share grand jury information with civil litigants in private actions, but the same
showing is required.'40
B. UNITED KINGDOM CONFIDENTIALITY LAWS
In the United Kingdom, bank records are confidential based on the Tournier
case, 141 which held that there is a contractual duty of secrecy between a banker and
135. Pursuant to § 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, tax information is confidential, but may
be shared with the Department of Justice if the case is referred for prosecution, with other law
enforcement agencies upon issuance of a court order, or with foreign authorities pursuant to a court
order if there is a mutual cooperation treaty.
136. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968) (citing United States v. Schmidt, 816
F.2d 1477, 1481 (10th Cir. 1987)).
137. Stansbury v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529 (1994) (whether Miranda rights attach depends
upon whether the suspect is in custody, but formal arrest is not determinative); Beckwith v. United
States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976) (Miranda rights did not attach when interview conducted in taxpay-
er's home, even if investigation was criminal in nature).
138. FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i); see United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 482 (1983) (IRS
civil investigation to determine a taxpayer's liability is not "preliminary to" a judicial proceeding);
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 904 F.2d 466, 468-69 (8th Cir. 1990) (disclosure of
grand jury materials to IRS proper where Tax Court proceeding pending and government's request
related to pending Tax Court litigation); In re Grand Jury 89-4-72, 932 F.2d 481, 487-88 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 958 (1991) (improper to order disclosure to state attorney disciplinary panel
because panel not judicial forum).
139. United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 419 (1983).
140. United States v. Nix, 21 F.3d 347, 352 (9th Cir. 1994).
141. Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank, [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.).
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his customer, but it is a qualified one. The circumstances warranting disclosure, as
set out in Tournier, are: "(1) Where disclosure is under compulsion by law;
(2) Where there is a duty to the public to disclose; (3) Where the interests of
the bank require disclosure; [and] (4) Where disclosure is made by the express
or implied consent of the customer. -142
Some provisions for voluntary disclosure by banks of suspicious transactions
for drug and money laundering offenses override the general duty of confidential-
ity. For money laundering offenses, a person who "discloses to a constable a
suspicion or belief that any funds or investments are derived from or used in
connection with criminal conduct" shall not be liable for breach of any restrictions
on disclosure. 43 For drug trafficking offenses, the same exception applies. Any-
one who "discloses to a constable a suspicion or belief that any funds or invest-
ments are derived from or used in connection with drug trafficking ... shall
not be considered in breach of any restriction on disclosure.'44 In such cases, an
individual who knows or suspects that an individual is laundering drug proceeds
or proceeds of other crimes and who fails to report a suspicious transaction shall
be guilty of an offense for "knowing assistance," i.e., "assisting another to
retain the benefit of drug trafficking," under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act or
"assisting another to retain the benefit of criminal conduct," under the Criminal
Justice Act 1993. Also, a person is not liable for breach of disclosure provisions
for disclosing to a constable a suspicion or belief that money or property is or
is derived from terrorist funds.
1 45
1. Powers to Compel Production of Evidence in the United Kingdom
A number of statutory provisions provide for production of documents or
compelled testimony from banks, defendants, and other witnesses. In some cases
these statutory provisions override the privilege against self-incrimination. 146
a. Serious Fraud Office Section 2 Powers
The Serious Fraud Office was created in 1987 and has significant powers to
compel testimony pursuant to section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987. Section
2(2) provides that
The Director may by notice in writing require the person whose affairs are to be
investigated ("the person under investigation") or any other person whom he has reason
to believe has relevant information to [answer questions or otherwise furnish information
142. Id. at 473.
143. Criminal Justice Act 1993 § 29, amending § 93 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to add
para. 93A(3)(a).
144. Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, § 24(3).
145. Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989, § 12.
146. The privilege against self-incrimination applies where "there is reasonable ground to appre-
hend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer." R. v. Boyes, [1861] 1 B & S 311,
at 330.
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with respect to any matter relevant to the investigation at a specified place and either
at a specified time or forthwith].
Section 2(3) provides for the production of documents that relate to any matter
under investigation and gives the director the power to take possession of any
relevant documents or to take any necessary steps to preserve them and prevent
interference with them. These powers may now be exercised by the director on
behalf of foreign prosecutors in response to requests submitted under the Criminal
Justice (International Co-Operation) Act 1990, if the request for assistance in-
volves serious or complex fraud. 1
47
A statement given in response to a section 2 order can only be used in evidence
against the defendant in a prosecution for making a false statement while in
purported compliance with section 2, or to impeach where, in giving evidence
on a prosecution for some other offense, the defendant makes a statement inconsis-
tent with it.' 48 The Securities Fraud Office (SFO) may not compel information
protected by legal professional privilege; however, a lawyer may be required to
furnish the name and address of the client. 149
The director has complete discretion with respect to section 2 powers in any
case of "serious fraud." The criteria for determining a "serious fraud" have
been identified by the Director as follows: "(i) the case must be complex in fact
and/or law; or (ii) it must be of considerable public interest or concern; and in
addition (iii) the value of the fraud must normally exceed £[ 1] million."' 50
b. Section 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986
In certain circumstances, the person may be compelled to testify even without
any undertakings by the requesting agency. Under section 236 of the Insolvency
Act 1986, a witness may be summoned to appear and cannot refuse to answer
questions by relying on the privilege against self-incrimination. In In re Arrows
Ltd. (No. 4)151 the court noted that "In Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd
v Maxwell. . . this court held that. . . '[a]ny statement made by a person during
his examination under section 236, or other provisions of the Act, is admissible
147. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, ch. 33, para. 164 (Eng.), amending ch. 5,
§ 4 of the Criminal Justice Act (International Co-Operation) Act 1990 to permit the secretary of
state, if satisfied
that an offence under the law of the country or territory in question has been committed
or that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that such an offence has been
committed; and that proceedings in respect of that offence have been instituted in that
country or territory or that an investigation into that offence is being carried on there,
and it appears to him that the request relates to an offence involving serious or complex
fraud, . . . [to] refer the request or any part of the request to the Director of the
Serious Fraud Office for him to obtain such evidence....
148. Criminal Justice Act 1987, ch. 38, § 2(8) (Eng.).
149. Id. § 2(9).
150. George Staple, Serious and Complex Fraud: A New Perspective, MOD. L. REV., Mar. 1993,
at 127, 127-29 (the value used to be £5 million but was lowered to £1 million in 1995).
151. [1993] 3 W.L.R. 513 (C.A.).
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in evidence against him in any proceedings, whether criminal or civil: see section
433 of the Act.' -152
In In re Arrows Ltd. the court held that the Serious Fraud Office could compel
production of the statements from the liquidators that they had obtained from
the defendant pursuant to section 236 of the Insolvency Act. The SFO had appealed
a decision that testimony of the defendant could not be compelled under the SFO's
section 2 powers unless the director of the SFO gave an undertaking that the
defendant's statements would not be used against the defendant, and that anyone
to whom the statements were shared would provide a similar undertaking. The
Court of Appeal found no basis for the undertakings to have been imposed,
holding that "by section 433 of the Insolvency Act 1986 Parliament has made
statements made by a person during his examination under section 236 admissible
in evidence against him in criminal as well as civil proceedings.',
5 3
The SFO's ability to use compelled testimony from the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) investigation was recently upheld by the Court of Appeal in
the Guinness case. 154 In this case the defendants argued that their convictions
should be overturned because the SFO used statements obtained by DTI inspectors
under section 434 of the Companies Act 1985 in violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination. A witness may be compelled to testify pursuant to section
434, and failure to comply is punishable as contempt of court under section 237.
The defendants argued that once it appeared that criminal offenses had been or
might have been committed, the DTI should have referred the case to the police,
and the defendants should have been cautioned in accordance with PACE § 66
Codes of Practice. The defendants argued that the statements should not have
been admitted for this reason.
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that Parliament had given
the DTI inspectors these powers and had chosen not to amend section 434(5) of
the Companies Act 1985 when it enacted section 2(8) of the Criminal Justice
Act 1987, limiting use of testimony compelled by the SFO under section 2 to
prosecutions for false statements or some other offense involving an inconsistent
statement. The Lord Chief Justice concluded that Parliament had made its inten-
tions quite clear in enacting section 434(5), and it would not be right for a judge
to exclude evidence simply on the ground that Parliament ought not to have
countenanced the possibility of self-incrimination.' 55 Defendant Saunders is ap-
pealing to the European Court of Human Rights.
c. Banking Act 1987
Under Section 39 of the Banking Act 1987, the Bank of England may compel
production of documents, even if privileged, "it may reasonably require for
152. Id. at 525.
153. Id.
154. Regina v. Saunders, [1996] 1 Crim. App. 463 (C.A. 1995).
155. Id.
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the performance of its functions." In Price Waterhouse and BCCI Holdings
(Luxembourg) S.A. the court held that the duty of confidentiality is not absolute;
disclosure is proper where there is a higher public interest in disclosure than in
maintaining confidentiality. The court stated that
The power of the bank under s. 39 of the Banking Act 1987 to obtain information and
require the production of documents overrides legal professional privilege and banking
confidentiality. When it comes to the supervision of authorized banks and the investiga-
tion of companies' affairs, Parliament has decreed that even banking confidentiality
and, in the former case, even legal professional privilege must yield to what it considers
to be a higher public interest. 16
d. Section 93 Orders under Proceeds of Crime Act 1995
The Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 contains new powers of investigation to trace
proceeds of crime. Section 93 gives the police the ability to apply to the court
for production orders or search and seizure orders in any case where (1) the
officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a specified person has benefited
from criminal conduct, (2) the material sought is likely to be of substantial value
to the investigation, (3) it is in the public interest, and (4) the items sought are
not subject to legal privilege. These powers may be exercised by the police in
response to foreign requests. This provision should supplement the 1990 Act in
cases where restraint and confiscation of assets are contemplated.
e. Mareva Disclosure Orders
As discussed above, in some circumstances the agency compelling the testi-
mony must give undertakings that the information will not be used against the
defendant. In connection with disclosure orders following the entry of a Mareva
injunction, the court may order that the information disclosed not be used in a
criminal proceeding against the witness. In the BCCI case, the court-appointed
liquidators were required to give an undertaking that they would not, without leave
of court, "use any information obtained by reason of the disclosure provisions in
the order except in applications in chambers or in camera for the purpose of
securing compliance with the Mareva injunction in these proceedings." '1 57 As
stated by Nolan, L.J.,
It must now be taken to be well settled, in this court at least, that a plaintiff who seeks
a worldwide Mareva injunction and an affidavit of the defendant's assets will only
succeed if he can satisfy the court that (1) he will not make improper use of the informa-
tion contained in the affidavit, and (2) he will not engage in vexatious and oppressive
proceedings against the defendant in other jurisdictions. 58
The court was mindful of the fact that the liquidators were under a duty to
cooperate with the United States pursuant to the plea agreement between BCCI,
156. [1992] B.C.L.C. 583 (C.A. 1991).
157. In re Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l S.A., [1994] 1 W.L.R. 708, 713 (C.A. 1993).
158. Id. at 717.
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Overseas; Bank of Credit and Commerce International Holdings (Luxembourg)
S.A.
Similarly, in In re 0,159 a criminal case, the Court of Appeal held that the
High Court had ancillary power under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to make a
disclosure order, just as the court has inherent power to make such orders in the
context of Mareva injunctions. Notwithstanding this power, the Criminal Justice
Act 1988 did not abrogate the common law rule against self-incrimination. Thus,
the court could impose a condition that "[n]o disclosure made in compliance
with this order shall be used as evidence in the prosecution of an offence alleged
to have been committed by the person required to make that disclosure or by
any spouse of that person."-60
The Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 gives the court the express power to order
defendants to provide information about the extent of their assets. This power
applies in cases where a defendant has been convicted and the prosecutor or the
court is seeking or considering a confiscation order. 61 No limitation exists on
use of the information in any other proceedings. However, since this provision
only applies postconviction, the privilege against self-incrimination should not
apply unless the defendant is concerned that disclosure will reveal other offenses,
such as tax evasion.
C. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
In many fraud cases, civil and criminal proceedings may overlap. In these
cases, the defendant may seek to stay the civil case to avoid either claiming or
waiving the privilege against self-incrimination.
The applicability of the Fifth Amendment privilege in civil proceedings was
the basis for a request for a stay in Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision. 162
The Office of Thrift Supervision brought a civil action against Charles H. Keating,
former president of Lincoln Savings and Loan. After commencement of the civil
action, he was indicted on state and federal criminal charges. An order was
entered against Keating in the civil case, directing him to pay $36 million in
restitution and banning him from the federally insured banking industry. On
appeal, Keating argued that the civil administrative action should have been stayed
pending the criminal proceedings and that his due process rights under the U.S.
Constitution were violated because he was forced to invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege during the administrative hearing, depriving him of an opportunity to
testify on his own behalf. This argument was rejected by the court of appeals,
which held that
159. [1991] 2 W.L.R. 475 (C.A. 1990).
160. Id. at 481.
161. Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, ch. 11, para. 4 (Eng.), amending ch. 33, § 73 of the Criminal
Justice Act 1988 to add § 73A.
162. 45 F.3d 322 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 94 (1995).
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The Constitution does not ordinarily require a stay of civil proceedings pending the
outcome of criminal proceedings. . . . A defendant has no absolute right not to be
forced to choose between testifying in a civil matter and asserting his Fifth Amendment
privilege. Not only is it permissible to conduct a civil proceeding at the same time as a
related criminal proceeding, even if that necessitates invocation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege, but it is even permissible for the trier of fact to draw adverse inferences
from the invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a civil proceeding.1
63
The court must weigh the public's interest in a speedy resolution of the contro-
versy against the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. Governmental entities
must be able to reassure the public that they are taking prompt action in response
to a crisis; however, concern for the public deterrence value must not be allowed
to override the individual defendant's due process rights. In Keating the court
concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion for the administrative law judge
to refuse to stay the civil proceedings pending the outcome of the state and federal
criminal trials.
A different approach was taken by the U.K. court in Regina v. The Institute
of Chartered Accountants (Ex Parte Brindle), 164 where the Court of Appeal stayed
a civil disciplinary inquiry of Price Waterhouse relating to the collapse of BCCI.
Price Waterhouse sought a stay on the grounds that it would be prejudicial to
require them to respond to the Committee of Inquiry because this information
could be used against them in other pending proceedings in the United Kingdom
and the United States. Price Waterhouse also cited lack of resources due to the
other pending cases and the concern that confidentiality laws would prohibit them
from adequately defending themselves. The Institute argued that it needed to be
able to demonstrate that it had acted swiftly in order to maintain public confidence.
Lord Justice Nolan noted that the test was whether there was a real risk of prejudice
or injustice if the inquiry were not adjourned until the pending litigation had
been concluded. He ordered a stay, finding that this was an enormously complex
inquiry and one that was not likely to be completed promptly or without impinging
upon Price Waterhouse's preparations for the civil proceedings.
D. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN INVESTIGATIONS AND ASSET SEIZURES
1. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
Under mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATS), bank secrecy laws are lifted
to provide access to bank and business records. The MLAT between the United
States and the United Kingdom 65 provides for assistance in compelling production
of documents, including bank records and witness statements.
163. Id. at 324, 326 (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976)).
164. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (Ex Parte Brindle), Court of
Appeals (Queen's Bench Div.), Dec. 21, 1993.
165. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters, January 6, 1994, available in 1994 WL 855115 (Treaty) approved by the United States
Senate Aug. 2, 1996, awaiting exchange of instruments of ratification.
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Article 16 provides for assistance in forfeiture proceedings and states that
"[t]he Parties shall assist each other in proceedings involving the identification,
tracing, freezing, seizure or forfeiture of the proceeds and instrumentalities of
crime. . . . Civil forfeiture orders obtained in connection with a criminal investi-
gation have been enforced in the United Kingdom; however, a restraining order
or judgment in a civil case would not be enforceable under this provision unless
it could be shown that it was ancillary to a criminal proceeding."'
66
The Council of Europe Money Laundering Convention provides for assistance
among the signatory countries in freezing and seizing assets, identifying and
tracing property liable to confiscation, and enforcement of confiscation orders
either by registering the foreign confiscation order or submitting the request to
the competent authorities in the requested state for entry of a confiscation order
under local law. 167 The United States has not yet signed this Convention; one
limitation is that U.S. law does not provide for enforcement of foreign forfeiture
orders for fraud in all cases, as proof that the proceeds were laundered or are
forfeitable under the RICO statute is required.
2. International Judicial Assistance Statute
The United States may provide assistance to foreign authorities under the
international Judicial Assistance Statute, 16 even in the absence of an MLAT.
Under this statute, a prosecutor in the district where the evidence is located can
be appointed a commissioner by the court with powers to subpoena the requested
evidence, or provide whatever assistance is requested. The statute contains vari-
ous restrictions. For example, the testimony, documents, or other types of assis-
tance sought must be "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal," not for use by an administrative body or investigating commission
that enjoys no adjudicative function.' 69 Although the statute does not require
that charges be filed, courts have held that proceedings should be "imminent,"
"within reasonable contemplation," or "very likely to occur."' 170
166. Id. art. 19(1):
For the purposes of this Treaty, "proceedings" means proceedings related to criminal
matters and includes any measure or step taken in connection with the investigation
or prosecution of criminal offences, including the freezing, seizure or forfeiture of
the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime, and the imposition of fines related to a
criminal prosecution.
167. Council of Europe: Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the
Proceeds from Crime, November 8, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 148 (1991); see art. 11 (seizing assets), art.
8 (identifying assets), art. 13 (enforcement of confiscation orders).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
169. See In re Letters Rogatory Issued by Dir. of Inspection of Gov. of India, 385 F.2d 1017,
1018 (2d Cir. 1967); Fonseca v. Blumenthal, 620 F.2d 322, 323 (2d Cir. 1980).
170. See In re International Judicial Assistance for Federal Republic of Brazil, 936 F.2d 702,
706 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Letter of Request from Crown Prosecution Serv., 870 F.2d 686, 691 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); In re Request for Assistance from Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151 (1 th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989).
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The evidence may be sought "by any interested person." 17' A police official
or prosecutor responsible for the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense
may be considered an "interested person" for purposes of making a request."'
Victims could make requests under this statute, although it is likely they would
need to retain private counsel to seek appointment as a commissioner to secure
the evidence. A person required to produce evidence under the statute is entitled
to claim any legally applicable privilege.
3. Criminal Justice (International Co-Operation) Act 1990
The Home Office can assist in international investigations pursuant to the
Criminal Justice (International Co-Operation) Act 1990. The Home Secretary,
through the office of the U.K. Central Authority, can seek a court order for
production of documents or compelled testimony upon request from a foreign
court or prosecuting authority in connection with an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion or proceeding. Charges do not have to be filed provided there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that an offense has been committed. 1 3 In addition, the
powers of entry, searches and seizure of PACE are available for offenses that
would constitute serious arrestable offenses if they had occurred in the United
Kingdom.174
E. DIscLosuRE TO VICTIMS
Evidence obtained in criminal investigations is not always available to civil
plaintiffs. While treaties and international agreements provide an excellent basis
for law enforcement cooperation, they may not be used by private parties and
they do not provide for disclosure of information to victims of crime unless the
information is disclosed in a criminal proceeding and becomes part of the public
record or the requesting country consents.
Specifically, article 1 of the U. S. -U. K. MLAT provides that" It]he provisions
of this Treaty shall not give rise to a right on the part of any private person to
obtain, suppress, or exclude any evidence .. " The reason for this provision
is that the treaties are intended to provide for direct cooperation between law
enforcement authorities. The treaties enable prosecutors and police to share infor-
mation with their foreign counterparts to investigate international crime and, in
doing so, utilize powers of investigation not available to private parties.
In addition, article 7 of the U.S.-U.K. MLAT provides that" [t]he Requesting
Party shall not use or disclose any information or evidence obtained under this
Treaty for any purposes other than for the proceedings stated in the request without
171. See In re Request from Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1152 n. 1 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)
(1992)).
172. Id. at 1154.
173. Criminal Justice (International Co-Operation) Act 1990, ch. 5, § 4 (Eng.).
174. Id. § 7.
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the prior consent of the Requested Party," except that information disclosed in
a public judicial or administrative hearing may thereafter be used for any purpose.
This provision limits the sharing of information with victims. If the implementing
legislation of the requested country does not provide for disclosure to victims,
the requested country may be powerless to consent.
In Marcel v. Commissioner of Police175 the court did not permit the police to
share documents obtained under the U.S.-U.K. MLAT with victims without the
consent of the person from whom they were seized. The court reasoned that
"documents seized by a public authority from a private citizen in exercise of a
statutory power can properly be used only for those purposes for which the
relevant legislation contemplated that they might be used. The user [sic] for any
other purpose of documents seized in exercise of a Draconian power of this
nature, without the consent of the person from whom they were seized, would
be an improper exercise of the power. "'76
In the United States, grand jury secrecy laws prohibit the sharing of grand
jury material with victims absent a court order. In the United Kingdom, the
Criminal Justice (International Co-Operation) Act 1990 does not provide for the
sharing of information with victims.
VI. Disposition of Seized Assets
The United States and the United Kingdom have different procedures for the
disposition of seized assets. In the United States, the seized assets are placed in
a fund administered by the U.S. Marshals Service and under the control of the
attorney general. The Marshals Service, not an independent court-appointed re-
ceiver, has the responsibility for liquidating the assets. Funds are disbursed from
the asset forfeiture fund only upon the attorney general's recommendation and
pursuant to statute. As discussed, the attorney general has discretion to remit
forfeited funds to victims or to share a portion of the funds with law enforcement
agencies assisting in the investigation. Funds may be shared with state, local,
and foreign law enforcement authorities as well as with the federal law enforce-
ment agency participating in the case. The United States has entered into several
asset-sharing agreements to provide for reciprocal sharing with foreign govern-
ments assisting in the forfeiture117 and has shared more than $36 million with
twenty countries in recognition of their forfeiture assistance.1
78
In the United Kingdom, funds paid to the court in satisfaction of a confiscation
175. [1991] 2 W.L.R. 1118 (C.A.), [1991] 1 All E.R. 845.
176. Marcel v. Commissioner of Police, Court of Appeal (Civil Div.), July 23, 1991, at 23; THE
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1991.
177. The United States has asset-sharing agreements with Canada, the Cayman Islands, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, the Netherlands, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom, and also has the ability
to share assets pursuant to mutual legal assistance treaties.
178. The United States has the ability to share forfeited assets with foreign governments that
assist in the case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981, 21 U.S.C. § 881, and 19 U.S.C. § 1616.
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order are transferred directly by the court into the Consolidated Fund. The money
is not used for law enforcement purposes, although the Home Office is considering
whether to permit the police and the Crown Prosecution Service to apply for
costs. This practice is consistent with the practice for receivers appointed to
enforce confiscation orders, who deduct their costs from the assets recovered
before the funds are paid in to the court. The proceeds of foreign confiscation
orders enforced in the United Kingdom are placed in a separate Seized Assets
Fund, and the funds are used for international drug investigations.
VII. Conclusion and Recommendations
The U.K. system for recovery of criminal proceeds and compensation of vic-
tims is simpler than the U.S. system. The confiscation order is based on the
amount by which the defendant benefited, any assets may be seized to satisfy
the order, and the victims may be compensated first. The United States needs
to follow the United Kingdom's example in the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 and
enact broader forfeiture provisions to cover all crimes. The attorney general's
discretion to award restitution out of forfeitures should be used more often in
fraud cases and prosecutors should make this recommendation and ensure that
the victims' losses are clearly set out. In addition, restitution needs to be available
for all victims, not just those listed in the indictment. As in the United Kingdom,
the judge should be required to explain why restitution is not awarded.
In both countries, prosecutors and investigators need greater ability to share
information with victims of fraud. Similarly, receivers and private parties repre-
senting the victims should be able to share information with the police on a
voluntary basis, without the need for a court order and without fear of violating
bank secrecy laws. Both countries need a means of controlling the costs of private
actions, so that the funds available to the victims are not depleted. The courts
could set a standard rate for liquidation costs or review the costs of winding up.
With the enhanced powers in the United Kingdom, and the proposal for broader
powers in the United States to forfeit proceeds of all crimes, prosecutors should
focus on a defendant's ill-gotten gains and seek forfeiture or confiscation and,
where appropriate, compensation and restitution to the victims. It is important
to ensure that crime does not pay. If defendants are allowed to secrete millions
in ill-gotten gains in secret bank accounts and have the money waiting for them
after they have served their sentences, a two- or three-year jail term might not
seem so bad.
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